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ABSTRACT
Although the agency theory has been widely used across a variety of corporate finance 
concepts for the past three decades, little work has been undertaken with regard to how 
the agency theory could be used to explain simultaneous interrelation among internal 
solutions for Agency problem. In addition, no general consensus has emerged after many 
years of investigation and scholars can often disagree about the same empirical evidence. 
Among other, potential endogeneity of the agency mechanisms, as well as cultural and 
structural differences between developed and developing markets, has been stated to 
cause the complexity of corporate governance around the world. This article reviews 
the theoretical and empirical literature addressing causal effects of managerial incentives 
and financial controlling instrument due to agency problem. At the same time, the article 
aims to improve the understanding of how these instruments affect each other. The main 
part of the discussion is related to the evaluation of theoretical aspects of internal Agency 
solution and their interrelations, as well as the experiential studies in different countries. 
As such, specification of Malaysian market is surveyed separately to highlight the need 
for multi-theoretic process and interrelation effects in future research on corporate 
agency problems in the Malaysian context.
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INTRODUCTION
Separation of corporate ownership 
may provide several benefits such as 
hierarchical decision making policy, firm 
size and developing investment strategies. 
However, it may bring harm in the sense 
that the managers have a lack of incentives 
to run the company efficiently and make 
it more profitable (Abdullah et al., 2011). 
Based on the agency theory, managerial 
incentives that include ownership and 
remuneration align the interest between 
managers and shareholders. On the other 
hand, it shows that some controlling 
approaches can resolve this dilemma, with 
leverage and dividends as two important 
financial solutions for this particular 
problem. However, managers are the 
ones who ultimately make decision about 
dividends and leverage. To be precise, 
these internal controlling instruments are 
methods that are impressed by managers. 
Conversely, dividends and leverage may 
affect the feasibility and attractiveness of 
managerial incentives.
As long as managers own only little 
portion of firms’ shares, they may pursue 
stock value maximisation due to the discipline 
of corporate control markets and managerial 
labour (Morck et al., 1988). However, as 
managers become large shareholders and 
have the supremacy to control the firms, 
they could divert the outside investors’ 
benefits to themselves (Jeelinek & Stuerke, 
2009; Benson & Davidson, 2010). Thus, 
the relation between managerial ownership 
and other instrument of agency solution is 
assumed to be complicated. According to 
risk–averse hypothesis, managers will be 
less motivated to have higher ownership 
at the presence of debt (Ahmed, 2008); 
therefore, debt is utilised as a monitoring 
substitute for managerial ownership. On the 
other hand, the entrenchment hypothesis 
postulates that owner-managers are liable to 
involve in actions that are detrimental to the 
benefits of debt issuers (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976) and attempt to restructure capital 
based on own benefits. Therefore, rational 
lenders attempt to limit owner-manager with 
stricter contract. If managerial ownership 
and dividends are served as monitoring 
instrument substitutes in controlling agency 
matter of free cash flow, a negative causal 
relation from dividends to managerial 
ownership could therefore be expected. In 
contrast, with respect to dividend theories 
(e.g., signalling theory or Lintner model), 
management will be more motivated to 
distribute higher dividends to themselves as 
shareholders.
More than managerial ownership, 
managerial remuneration is another internal 
solution of agency problem although the 
relation between these two managerial 
incentive instrument on managerial 
ownership is ambiguous (Attaway, 2000; 
McConaughy, 2000); factors such as tax, 
regulation, culture and financial factors 
of firm (e.g., leverage, risk, dividends 
and performance) may influence this 
relation. The convergence of interest 
hypothesis (COI) posits that increasing 
share ownership by managers will increase 
their interest aligned with the shareholders 
(Ang et al., 2000; Fleming et al., 2005) 
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although entrenchment hypothesis argues 
that owner-managers have more influence 
to derive more remuneration from firms 
without considering their performance 
(Allen, 1981; Holderness & Sheehan, 1988; 
Werner et al., 2005). Moreover, leverage 
and remuneration are two policies for 
reducing conflicts between shareholders 
and managers but applying each one will 
lead to distress for another (Agha, 2013). 
Besides, managers have to exercise debt for 
financing new projects. Managers also try to 
avoid the risk of leverage because they want 
to protect their career. Thus, shareholders 
have to compensate this problem by giving 
higher remuneration for managers. Firms 
with high debt, however, will likely have 
less free cash flow, and are thus less likely 
able to pay high remuneration. The relation 
between managerial remuneration and other 
controlling instruments (i.e., dividend) is 
indistinctive as well. Some studies have 
highlighted the association between various 
forms of executive compensation and 
the payout policies of a firm (Aboody & 
Kasznik, 2000; Kahle & Kathleen, 2002). 
As per the pecking order theory, firms prefer 
to rely more on internal funds or retained 
earnings; as a result, the firms will have a 
tendency to pay less dividend and hence 
have higher retained earnings. On the 
other hand, shareholders expect managers 
of highly profitable firms to pay higher 
dividends in order to reduce agency costs.
As elaborated earlier on, there are 
interrelations between managerial incentives 
and managerial controlling instrument. In 
other words, not only managerial incentives 
affect leverage and dividend, leverage and 
dividend also have impacts on managerial 
incentives. In most mechanisms of corporate 
governance, endogeneity is not considered, 
and this ignorance of their interrelations 
leads to an incomprehensive interpretation 
of their empirical results. This paper aims 
at providing readers with a comprehensive 
understanding of simultaneous 
interrelations among the four mentioned 
internal instrument of agency problem by 
reviewing relevant empirical studies based 
on the original agency theory, Entrenchment 
hypothesis, Convergence interest hypothesis 
and pecking order theory.
In addition, this paper also contributes 
to the internal agency solutions in three 
ways. First, it describes how studies on 
internal agency solutions are interrelated and 
they are illustrated as integrated mechanisms. 
Second, the literature review of this paper 
focuses on the simultaneous interrelation 
between internal agency solutions. To 
the researchers’ understanding, this is 
the first work studying on this particular 
issue. Third, the paper highlights several 
avenues to advance the field of study, while 
providing useful and practical implications 
in the Malaysian context at the same time. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as 
follows: Section 2 provides theories that 
explain the interrelation between each pair 
of four instruments and relevant literature. 
Section 3 briefly discusses the traits of these 
instruments in the Malaysian market that may 
cause different reactions to agency problem 
compared to developed country. Finally, a 
brief conclusion is given in Section 4.
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REVIEWING PROCESS
Research Methodology 
The methodology used in this study is 
documentary research using electronic 
databases and data reduction procedures to 
collect information about the interrelations 
between managerial ownership, 
remuneration, dividends and leverage as 
internal instruments for agency problem. 
The initial reviews revealed several hundred 
published articles in every instrument and 
also their relations. Due to space constraint, 
this paper focuses only on the most widely 
cited papers of each theoretical concept. 
This study also includes 21 articles that 
investigated the simultaneous interrelations 
of the four internal agency solutions. The 
variables, area of study and methods are 
illustrated in Table 1 below. The findings 
can be retrieved from the literature review. 
Finally, the empirical studies carried out in 
Malaysia are investigated. A brief review 
of the Original Agency Theory and two 
related hypotheses are explained in the 
subsequent paragraphs.
TABLE 1
Selected studies of interrelation among managerial incentive and internal controlling instruments
Year Authors Country interrelated variables Methods
2014 Persson Sweden Debt, Dividend and Managerial Ownership 3SLS(CMP), 
3SLS, 2SLS
2014 Gao and Li USA CEO Ownership and Compensation 2SLS
2014 O’Callaghan et al. UK Ownership structure, compensation and  
Performance
2SLS
2014 Vo et al. Vietnam Debt, Dividend and Managerial Ownership 3SLS
2014  Moussa and Chichti Tunisia Debt ratio and Managerial Ownership 3SLS
2013 Shiyyab et al. EU Performance, Large Shareholder, Board Size, 
Managerial Ownership, , Outside Directors and 
Executive Compensation
3SLS
2013 Bao and Yang China Dividends and Compensation Tobit regression
2012 Nyonna USA Insider Ownership and Debt 2SLS
2012 Lopez et al. 16 Countries Capital structure, Ownership structure and 
Valuation
3SLS
2011 Lee and Chen Taiwan CEO  Compensation, Ownership and Firm 
Value
2SLS
2009 Zhang USA Debt and Executive Stock Options 2SLS
2008 Bhattacharyya et al. Canada Dividend  and Executive Compensation  Tobit regression
2007 Ghosh India, USA, 
UK, Ireland
Leverage, Managerial Ownership and Firm 
Valuation
3SLS
2007 Kim et al. Korea Debt, Dividend,  Managerial Ownership 2SLS
2007 Ortiz and Hernan USA Leverage and Compensation  2SLAD 
2006 Hardjopranoto Indonesia Debt, Dividend,  Managerial Ownership 3SLS
2006 Joher et al. Malaysia Debt and Managerial Ownership 2SLS
2006  Ghosh and Sirmans USA CEO ownership, Dividends, Compensation 2SLS
2006 Faulkender et al. USA Dividends, Leverage 2SLS
1999 Chen et al. USA Director Ownership, Leverage, Dividends, Risk Nonlinear 2SLS
1992 Jensen et al. USA Debt, Dividend, Managerial Ownership 3SLS
2SLS: Two Stage Least Squares, 3SLS: Two Stage Least Squares, 2SLAD: two-stage least absolute deviation
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Econometrics Considerations of the 
Review
According to Gujarati and Porter (2009), 
“By combining time series of cross-section 
observations, panel data gives: more 
informative data, more variability, less 
collinearity among variables, more degrees 
of freedom, more efficiency, and better 
dynamic change.”  Therefore, papers using 
panel data were chosen in this study to 
investigate the interrelations between the 
selected variables. In the presence of the 
simultaneously determined variables, the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method will 
produce biased and inconsistent results 
(Hill et al., 2008). Hill et al. (2008) also 
offer Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM), 
which is an econometric model for data 
that is jointly determined by two or more 
economic relationships as an alternative 
to OLS. Two alternative approaches 
(namely, Single equation estimation and 
System estimation) can be used to estimate 
a simultaneous equation regression 
model. The Two Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS), used by Theil (1961), Basmann 
(1957) and Sargan (1958), was initially 
propounded as a method of estimation for 
a single equation’s parameters of a model. 
Similarly, the Tree stage least squares 
(3SLS) can also be used to estimate a 
model of simultaneous equations that 
includes endogenous independent variables 
with dependent variables’ role of other 
equations in the model (Zellner & Theil, 
1962). The 3SLS technique consists of 
two different methods, namely, 2SLS and 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). 
This technique is used in a system of 
endogenous equations (Zellner, 1962). For 
a better understanding of the simultaneous 
interrelation between the agency 
instruments, this study also discusses the 
two-way causality between the variables 
based on the findings of papers that used 
the simultaneous equation models as their 
methodology. For instance, according to 
the finding by Kim Ph et al. (2007) who 
investigated the relation between leverage 
and managerial ownership or dividends 
and managerial ownership, the OLS 
methods indicated no relation between 
them; however, when the data were run by 
using the 2SLS method, the results showed 
significant relations between them. This 
finding has also been reported in most of 
the empirical papers.
 
The Agency Theory
The Original Agency Theory
The cornerstone of the agency theory is the 
assumption that the interest of principles 
and agents diverges (Hill & Jones, 1992). 
According to the traditional agency theory 
by Jensen and Meckling (1979), equity 
agency cost is zero when there is a 100 
per cent ownership by the manager’s 
organisation, and there is a positive 
relationship between equity agency costs 
and the separation of ownership and control 
(Fleming et al., 2005). Jensen and Meckling 
(1979) hypothesised that managerial 
ownership is an important mechanism 
for aligning the interests of managers and 
shareholders. They also mentioned another 
way to reduce equity agency costs, i.e. 
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to use more debt financing. Using more 
debt reduces total equity financing and 
in return, this will lower the scope of the 
manager-stockholder conflict. The agency 
theory suggests that principals who find it 
difficult to observe or even monitor agents’ 
behaviour will use higher proportions 
of compensation (Baker et al., 1988; 
Jensen & Murphy, 1990). The payment of 
dividends may serve to align the interests 
and mitigate the agency problems between 
managers and shareholders by reducing the 
discretionary funds available to managers 
(Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984).
Convergence-of-Interest and 
Entrenchment Hypotheses
There are two opposing viewpoints regarding 
managerial ownership in the modern agency 
theory; these being the convergence-of-
interest hypothesis and the entrenchment 
hypothesis, Jensen and Meckling (1979) 
stated that minimal ownership might cause 
managers to work less vigorously and/or 
consume more perquisites. Consequently, 
increasing managerial ownership leads to 
a convergence of interests between and 
ownership, and reduces agency costs. On the 
other hand, too much managerial ownership 
leads to entrenchment, and thus an increase in 
agency costs (Morck et al., 1988). Dividend 
payments are expected to have a negative 
effect on debt if the convergence of interest 
theory is valid. Alternatively, dividends 
are expected to have positive impact on 
debt according to the entrenchment theory 
(Schooley & Barney, 1994). Meanwhile, 
dividend payout is expected to have a negative 
effect on stock ownership if the convergence 
of interest theory is applicable, and to have 
a positive impact on stock ownership if the 
entrenchment theory holds (Chen & Steiner, 
1999).
Theoretical and Empirical Debate on the 
Internal Agency Instrument 
Interrelation between Managerial 
ownership and Dividends
The key idea behind the Agency theory is 
that the impossibility of perfect contracting 
inevitably and the existence of information 
asymmetry cause a conflict of interest 
between shareholders and management. 
Shareholders can mitigate this contradiction 
and also reduce agency costs by increasing 
dividends (Chen & Steiner, 1999).
Hence, based on the convergence 
interest hypothesis, managerial ownership 
and dividends may be considered as 
substitute mechanisms as they reduce 
agency costs, and thus, it is not effective 
to exercise two instruments at the same 
time to resolve the same problem. Lower 
dividend increases the likelihood that a 
company engages in managerial ownership 
programme and vice versa. Studies such 
as by Rozeff (1982), Jensen et al. (1992), 
Espen Eckbo and Verma (1994) and Peng 
et al. (2001) found a negative relation 
between them. On the other hand, the 
Entrenchment hypothesis claims that a 
company with higher levels of managerial 
ownership is intentionally presenting 
higher level of amount of payout due to the 
interest of managers (Schooley & Barney, 
1994; Hu & Kumar, 2004).
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Besides, it has been recognised in 
the recent academic studies that dividend 
and managerial ownership policies are 
interrelated (Short et al., 2002). Jensen et 
al. (1992) used a simultaneous equations 
model (SEM) and found that inside 
ownership affects dividends in a negative 
way. Similarly, the results of the SEM 
research by Kim et al. (2007) showed 
that dividends are negatively related 
to inside ownership and vice versa. In 
contrast, Bao (2013) found that managerial 
shareholding has positive impact on 
corporate cash dividends. The results 
of the study by Vo and Nguyen (2014) 
indicate that companies with higher levels 
of managerial holdings deliberately choose 
higher level of dividends. The recent article 
by Persson (2014) highlights a two-way 
causal relation between dividend policies 
and inside ownership; dividends have a 
positive effect on inside ownership whereas 
inside ownership influences dividends in a 
negative way.
Interrelationship between Managerial 
Ownership and Leverage
The leverage has high magnitude to the 
predominant role of the ownership structure 
(Ezeoha & Okafor, 2010). Exercise of debt 
may lead to managerial discretion reduction 
and cause mitigate interest divergence 
between managers and fund contributors 
for the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The convergence of interest (COI) theory 
posits that leverage and insiders ownership 
can be assumed as substitutes. However, 
Bathala et al. (1994) argued that slathers 
of managerial ownership can lead to 
entrenchment, and the outcome of the 
entrenchment hypothesis (ENT) is that 
owners cannot solve agency problem by 
presenting managers with more ownership 
stocks (Ahmed, 2008); this implies that 
owners will employ leverage instead. Thus, 
managerial shareholdings should be related 
to debt policy in a positive way. However, 
due to the fact that the entrenchment 
problem causes the controlling insiders to 
have more probability to make decisions 
that are harmful for the debt issuers’ 
interests, the debt issuers will strongly 
attempt to impose more influence on the 
managerial decision of firms (Short & 
Keasey, 1999; Demsetz & Villalonga, 
2001). Debt holders also may envisage that 
an upper level of debt cost is linked to the 
risk of insider ownership. The studies of 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Fields Jr et 
al. (2010), on the other hand, showed that 
insider ownership is not related to the cost 
of debt.
The interrelation between inside 
ownership and leverage is acceptable in 
the recent academic literature. Givoly 
et al. (1992) found that high managerial 
ownership firms choose lower levels of 
debt. Meanwhile, Jensen et al. (1992) 
posited that the financial policies not 
affecting the levels of inside ownership, 
but inside ownership affects debt a negative 
way. The previous research by Chen and 
Steiner (1999) supports the convergence 
of interest theory and also suggests that 
inside ownership is negatively related to 
debt; this finding is consistent with the 
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study by Ghosh (2007). Moreover, Kim et 
al. (2007) expressed that inside ownership 
and debt have a negative interrelationship. 
Nyonna (2012) found a significant negative 
relation between them with a causality in 
both directions. Vo and Nguyen (2014) 
also indicated that managerial ownership 
has a negative relationship with leverage. 
Moussa and Chichti (2014) showed that 
the ownership structure affects the capital 
structure in a nonlinear way and vice 
versa. Persson (2014) argues that the effect 
from managerial ownership is directly 
imposed on debt policy in a negative way. 
In fact, debt policy does not affect inside 
ownership even though López-Iturriaga 
and Rodríguez-Sanz (2012) claimed 
that financial leverage and ownership 
structure are conditional based on the legal 
environment. Although both mechanisms 
work as complementary mechanisms 
in the civil law system, they seem to be 
substituting mechanisms in common law 
firms.
Interrelation between Managerial 
Ownership and Remuneration
The Traditional Agency theory predicts a 
negative relationship between managerial 
equity ownership and managerial 
remuneration since alignment between 
shareholders and executives is an increasing 
function of managerial ownership (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). In this view, researchers 
believe that managerial ownership 
eliminates managerial compensation 
requirement based on convergence 
interest hypothesis, that is, ownership and 
compensation mechanisms may substitute 
one another and a higher level of ownership 
concentration may be associated with less 
necessity for incentive alignment (Mehran, 
1995; Aggarwal & Samwick, 1996; Mat 
Nor & Sulong, 2007; Conyon et al., 2010; 
Fernandes et al., 2013).
Alternatively, entrenchment managerial 
ownership may allow managers to impose 
highly contingent compensation contracts 
on executives, leading to a positive 
relationship between managerial ownership 
and managerial remuneration (Allen, 1981; 
Holderness & Sheehan, 1988; Cheung et 
al., 2005; Werner et al., 2005). In other 
words, ownership and compensation 
mechanisms may complement each other. 
As a major explanation for executive 
compensation, the traditional agency 
theory has been challenged and criticised 
as under-socialised for its inability to 
explain cross country differences (Bruce & 
Buck, 2005; Mintzberg, 2009; Filatotchev 
& Allcock, 2010).
Lee and Chen (2011) discovered that 
CEO ownership and CEO compensation 
are interdependent and that ownership 
is positively associated with CEO 
compensation. Similarly, Gao and Li 
(2014) also argued that CEO’s annual 
compensation is more important than his 
equity ownership. That is, managers are 
interested to enhance compensation benefits 
in every level of ownership. Recently, 
O’Callaghan et al. (2014) reported 
sensitivity of executive remuneration to 
firm performance is associated with the 
degree of managerial equity ownership and 
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ownership concentration in negative way. 
Their results indicated that in a firm where 
monitoring of managers activities is poorer 
and the separation of management and 
ownership is greater, the pay-performance 
sensitivity is more evident. In general, the 
impact of managerial ownership structure 
on managers’ pay is vague given the 
miscellaneous nature of the empirical 
findings.
The Interrelation between Managerial 
Remuneration and Dividends
Kahle and Kathleen (2002) suggested that 
amendments in compensation schemes 
have caused changes in firms’ payout 
policies. This means that if remuneration 
scheme achieves to align Managers 
and shareholders interest based on the 
convergence interest theory, then the role 
of dividends as a substitute alternative is 
mitigated. The study by Bhattacharyya 
et al. (2008) indicates that executive 
compensation is negatively associated with 
dividend payout.
Generally, dividend decisions reflect 
managerial motives and incentives (Tirole, 
2010). If dividend payout is an effective 
tool for mitigating agency costs, efficient 
managerial compensation packages should 
then be designed to reward appropriate 
levels of dividend payout. A stock option 
compensation for CEOs leads to lower 
dividends but other kinds of remuneration 
should be positively related to dividends 
(Geiler & Renneboog, 2014). Otherwise, 
dividends may be used as a complement 
method to reduce the agent theory according 
to the entrench hypothesis. In line with this 
notion, some scholars assigned a positive 
linkage between executive remuneration 
and dividend payment (Healy, 1985; 
Lewellen et al., 1987). Bao (2013) also 
reported that executive wage has a positive 
impact on corporate cash dividends, i.e., 
managers who are entrenched and receive 
a larger part of compensation through 
salary and bonus rather than long-term 
rewards linked to firm performance are 
less sensitive to shareholder values, and 
pay higher dividends (Ghosh & Sirmans, 
2006). However, the other factors such as 
investment opportunity has an essential 
role between managerial remuneration and 
dividend (Chen, 2010).
 
The Interrelation between Managerial 
Remuneration and Leverage
The agency cost of equity hypothesis 
suggests that debt mitigates shareholder-
manager agency problems by inducing 
lenders to monitor, reducing free cash flow 
available to managers and forcing managers 
to focus on value maximisation when 
facing the threat of bankruptcy (Grossman 
& Hart, 1982; Jensen, 1986). In addition, 
explaining the agency theory, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) assumed that managers 
are risk averse and try to reduce the financial 
risk to protect their jobs and personal wealth 
(Fosberg, 2004; Hardjopranoto, 2006a). 
As a result, managers who run companies 
with higher level of risk should get higher 
remuneration than managers who handle 
companies with lower risk. In other words, 
managers who are willing to tolerate extra 
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risks and face uncertainty of returns should 
be compensated accordingly. Moreover, 
receiving debt by managers leads to more 
financial risks for firms. Based on this 
view, and because of the remunerations 
involved, managers take the financial risk 
of new projects.
Rational lenders price debt by 
considering executive incentive structure 
(Brander & Poitevin, 1992). When 
shareholders and managerial interests 
are strongly aligned, managers have 
the incentives to decide about 
investment plans that benefit shareholders 
at the cost of bondholders. Nonetheless, 
this may lead to higher cost level of debt 
finance. Since shareholder-bondholder 
arguments are more intense in more 
levered companies, these companies may 
find optimal to decrease agency costs of 
debt finance by inducing a lower incentive 
alignment with their executives, even 
though doing so may raise the agency costs 
of equity.
Zhang (2009) found that executive 
stock options and debt practice are 
substitutes to decrease free cash flow 
problem. In addition, he also posited his 
result as more pronounced in firms that 
tend to have much severe agency problem. 
Ortiz-Molina (2007) realised reduction in 
the condition of in direct-debt leverage 
for performance base payment sensitivity. 
However, the results of the study by Shiyyab 
et al. (2013) indicated that leverage has an 
insignificant negative impact on executive 
compensation levels.
The Interrelation between Dividends 
and Leverage
Easterbrook (1984) revealed that dividends 
might keep the firm in the capital market 
because they could monitor managers at a 
lower cost. Debt and dividends could be 
substitutes or complements in reducing the 
agency cost. The policies are substitutes 
if the convergence of interests is effective 
(Rozeff, 1982; Faccio et al., 2001) or 
complements if the entrenchment theory 
is effective (Hardjopranoto, 2006). If 
the entrenchment theory is effective, the 
shareholders could use a combination of 
debt and dividends to monitor managers 
because they cannot be monitored by 
offering them more ownership stakes. This 
finding suggests that dividends should be 
positively related to debt.
Meanwhile, Myers and Majluf (1984) 
explained that firms follow a hierarchy 
of financial decisions when establishing 
its capital structure. In fact, the Pecking 
Order Theory is based on the presence 
of asymmetric information between 
managers and outside investors and the 
assumption that managers act in the 
interest of existing shareholders (Shen, 
2014). Initially, firms first finance projects 
with the retained earnings because this 
finance method incurs no flotation costs 
and requires no disclosure of the firm’s 
financial information (Bevan & Danbolt, 
2002). If the retained earnings are not 
sufficient, the firms will go for debt 
(DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 2007), and if 
further financing is required, the last option 
for the firm is to issue equity. Therefore, 
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higher level of dividends payout will lead 
to higher level of debt to finance new 
investment.
Leverage policy is not determined 
independently, but rather simultaneously 
with other factors such as firm’s dividend 
policy (Crutchley et al., 1999). Kim et 
al. (2007) and Faulkender et al. (2006) 
indicated a significant  positive impact of 
leverage on dividend. Furthermore, the 
findings of Persson (2014) disclosed a 
positive two-way causal relation between 
total debt and dividends. Based on the 
finding by Vo and Nguyen (2014), however, 
there is a substitution relationship between 
leverage and dividend in the mechanism of 
controlling the agency conflicts.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical discussion on the 
interrelationship between managerial 
ownership, compensation, dividend policy 
and debt policy is summarised in Fig.1 and 
Table 2 below. The general conclusions that 
follow from them are that causality may 
proceed in either direction between each pair 
of the variables. For instance, Table 2 indicates 
that the effects of dividends on managerial 
ownership can be explained based on two 
different hypotheses; from the Entrenchment 
hypothesis, the positive effect is expected, 
and from the convergence of interest view, the 
negative effect can be predicted (see Arrow 
10). Moreover, the same predictions are also 
possible from the managerial ownership to 
dividends (see Arrow 9).
Fig.1: The interrelation framework between internal agency solutions 
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TABLE 2
Expected Impact amongst the Variables
Arrow no.                               Effect prediction         
1 Entrenchment hypothesis(+),convergence hypothesis(-), pecking 
Order Theory(+)
2 Entrenchment hypothesis(+), convergence hypothesis(-)
3 Entrenchment hypothesis(+), convergence hypothesis(-)
4 Entrenchment hypothesis(+), convergence hypothesis(-)
5 Entrenchment hypothesis(+), convergence hypothesis(-)
6 Entrenchment hypothesis(+), convergence hypothesis(-)
7 Entrenchment hypothesis(+), convergence hypothesis(-)
8 Entrenchment hypothesis(+), convergence hypothesis(-)
9 Entrenchment hypothesis(+), convergence hypothesis(-)
10 Entrenchment hypothesis(+), convergence hypothesis(-)
11 Agency theory (-)
12 Agency theory (+)
and complexity in the use of corporate 
governance instruments. In this section, the 
specification of the four mentioned internal 
agency solutions are discussed.
In the case of Malaysia, capital 
structure is formed by the highest belonging 
of family businesses [almost 60% by 
Claessens et al. (2000) and 37% by Afza 
Amran and Che Ahmad (2009)] and the 
government properties. This means that the 
Government is involved in firms’ business, 
in which 22% Government Linked 
Companies (GLCs) in 1999 (Claessens et 
al., 1999) and this proportion increased 
to 36% in later years (Mokhtar, 2005). By 
adding a high proportion of managerial 
ownership, the issue becomes more 
complex [43%, as mentioned by Sulong 
et al. (2013), 27% as stated by Mustapha 
and Ahmad (2011b), 21% by Zunaidah and 
INTERNAL AGENCY 
INSTRUMENTS IN THE 
MALAYSIAN CONTEXT
Malaysia is one of the fast growing 
economies that have successfully developed 
from a commodity-based economy to one 
that focused on manufacturing from the 
early 1980s through the mid-1990s. The 
origin of the 1997 financial crisis in Malaysia 
lies in the structural weaknesses in its 
domestic financial institutions which were 
supported by inaccurate macroeconomic 
policies and moral hazard (Corsetti et al., 
1998). Thereafter, policymakers reformed 
corporate governance in Malaysia several 
times by codifying Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance, Capital Market 
Master Plan and Financial Sector Master 
Plan. However, some natures of the 
Malaysian capital structures cause difficulty 
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Fauzias (2008) and 29 % by Kanapathy 
(2005)]. In addition, Ahmed (2008) also 
stated that among 100 blue-chip stocks, 
a higher level of managerial ownership 
could reduce the agency conflict between 
external equity claimholders and managers 
during the 1997-2001 period. Within these 
concentrated ownerships of companies, 
managers might have little influence on 
decision making policies. In addition, 
minority shareholders are doubtful to 
influence the decisions regarding how 
companies are run, whether qualified 
managers are running the firms or whether 
they are chosen based on Relationships or 
political connections. For this reason, how 
can agency problem be resolved or faded 
out by offering firm’s share to managers in 
the Malaysian context?
Other than that, executive 
compensations are vigorously debated 
in Malaysia (Wooi and Ming, 2009). 
Directors’ payment increased by 23% 
in six years (Kaur & Rahim, 2007). 
Moreover, total directors’ payout in top 
20 companies increased by 22% in 2009 
(Hamsawi, 2011). Family ownership and 
managerial ownership show uncertainty 
in relation to managers’ remuneration. 
For instance, Vicknes (2003) found that 
most owners-managed companies tend 
to have heftier payout to their managers. 
Conversely, Dogan and Smyth (2002) 
reported that board remuneration is 
negatively associated with ownership 
concentration for Malaysian listed firms. 
Likewise, directors’ payouts in GLCs 
have grown approximately 12% lower 
compared to others (Minhat & Abdullah, 
2014). Similarly, Salim and Wan-Hussin 
(2009) also found that among pay-without-
performance firms, executives earn higher 
pay as managerial ownership increases, 
and this suggests that rent extraction 
through overcompensation is likely to be in 
tandem with the managerial power theory. 
Some studies, however, could not find 
any relation between debt and managerial 
remuneration in Malaysia (Yatim, 2013; 
Amin et al., 2014). Consequently, there 
are different remuneration policies among 
firms in Malaysia that cause difficulty 
to account executive remuneration as an 
instrument for the agency problem.
Mustapha and Ahmad (2011a) stated 
that debt structure has a significant and 
negative relationship with total monitoring 
costs in the firms listed on the Main and 
Second Boards of Bursa Malaysia. In 
addition, capital structure is argued as very 
much dependent on the dominant nature 
of the ownership structure (Ezeoha & 
Okafor, 2010). Ahmed (2008) posits that 
the debt policy, which serves as a positive 
monitoring substitute for agency conflict 
as positive and significant in explaining the 
level of ownership concentration. Mustapha 
et al. (2011) exclaimed that significant 
relationships exist between debt structure 
and ownership structure, specifically in 
the case of Malay executive directors’ 
shareholdings. Meanwhile, Appannan 
and Sim (2011) confirmed the positive 
correlation between current dividends with 
firms’ debt equity ratio in the food industry 
and stated if the debt equity ratio was low, 
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the dividend payment would be lower. The 
findings by Ling et al. (2008) showed that 
dividend-paying companies have lower 
firm leverage as compared to non dividend-
paying companies that may be consistent 
with the agency theory.
As a developing country, Malaysia 
still lacks studies that look into the most 
important determinants of the dividend 
policy for the listed firms (Appannan & 
Sim, 2011). One of the conflicts about 
the dividend policy in Malaysian public 
listed companies is that due to personal 
tax exemption, managers are reluctant 
to cut or avoid omitting dividend even 
when the performance of the companies is 
deteriorating due to shareholders pressure 
(Ling et al., 2008). Furthermore, Ahmed 
(2008) also explains that dividend policies, 
which also serve as monitoring tools, 
substitute to reduce agency conflict between 
manager and external shareholders and do 
not appear to have any significant impact 
on managerial ownership. However, the 
manager-owner concentration strengthens 
the complicacy of the dividends policy as a 
financial instrument for the agency conflict.
Due to some characters mentioned in 
the Malaysian context, these instruments 
seem to be more complex to solve the 
agency problem compared to those of the 
developed country. Moreover, firms usually 
apply more than one method as a solution 
for their agency problem or use another 
method when carrying out their business 
activities. When the interrelation among 
them is considered, the agency solution 
mechanisms are found out be more intricate.
CONCLUSION
This paper reviews the interrelationships 
between debt policy, dividend policy, 
managerial ownership and managerial 
remuneration based on the original 
agency theory, convergence of interest 
and entrenchment hypotheses and pecking 
order theory. Taking COI, ENT and also 
explaining the variety of simultaneous 
system studies into consideration, this article 
has attempted to bridge the conceptual gap 
of relationship between the influences of 
individual internal agency instruments and 
their expected synchronised effects as an 
aggregated mechanism. For this purpose, 
three groups of articles were selected: the 
main theoretical and empirical article, the 
articles that use SEM, and the articles that 
identify the characters and related findings 
of these internal agency solutions in the 
Malaysian market. By considering the first 
two groups of articles, this paper has shown 
that as there was no particular attention 
given to the interrelationships between 
these instruments, the researchers were 
not able to infer the market mechanisms to 
mitigate agency problems. The interrelation 
framework and its expected impact table 
proposed the comprehensive perception 
to realise intricate agency solutions. In 
other words, understanding the condition 
of managers’ status based on the COI and 
ENT hypotheses, as well as considering the 
simultaneous two-way causality between 
instruments, leads to understanding of the 
market mechanism and also the ability 
to investigate the effectiveness of these 
instruments. Moreover, the concentrated 
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ownership structure and some cultural and 
regulatory differences of the Malaysian 
market, compared to the developed country 
that was previously described, highlights 
the importance of exclusive and extensive 
studies of simultaneous interrelations 
among the internal agency instruments in 
this market. In particular, future survey 
carried out in Malaysia may enhance the 
knowledge about the agency theory in 
the concentrated ownership with sensible 
managerial ownership.
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